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1. Abstracts 
1.1. English 
 
Energy markets in Czech and Slovak Republic in the context of 
liberalization 
 
 
Despite of a decade of market liberalization in Europe, final electric energy prices did not drop 
significantly in recent years in Czech Republic or Slovakia and continue to be one of the highest 
among European Union member states. This thesis aims to capture and explain the drivers 
behind the recent price development in the context of liberalization and integration of markets. 
Liberalization should enable alternative providers of electricity (including producers of energy 
from renewable sources) to access the energetic grid, which was not the case in the past and 
prevented them to compete with the traditional monopolies at the national markets. Market 
structure is identified as one of the decisive factors determining industry dynamics in Czech 
Republic and Slovakia, especially engagement of the state as the controlling shareholder of the 
dominant market players. An assessment of market power based on market share of subjects and 
switching behavior of customers is delivered in order to determine whether what is observed are 
competitive market prices. Following a comprehensive market structure characterization the 
thesis analyzes price components – deregulated and regulated part – separately. In wholesale 
prices trading is essential which was facilitated by the establishment of a common day-ahead 
market, i.e. market coupling in the third quarter 2009. We analyze hourly market data to evaluate 
the level of effectiveness with which market coupling operates and find that while wholesale 
markets are efficient, regulated fees were set incorrectly with distribution fees accounting for 
largest difference in prices and constitute the main reason for price differential in the examined 
region.   
 
Keywords: electricity markets, liberalization packages, market coupling 
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1.2. German 
 
Energiemärkte in Tschechien und der Slowakei im Kontext der 
Liberalisierung  
 
 
Obgleich die Liberalisierung in Europa bereits seit einem Jahrzehnt fortschreitet, sinken die 
Preise für Elektrizitätsversorgung in Tschechien und Slowakei nicht, sie gehören sogar zu den 
teuersten unter den Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Union. Diese Arbeit identifiziert und 
erklärt Treiber der letzten Preisentwicklung im Kontext der Liberalisierung und Integration von 
Energiemärkten. Im Zuge der Liberalisierung sollte sich auf für alternative Energieversorger 
(einschließlich Erzeuger von Elektrizität aus erneubaren Quellen) ein freier Zugang zum Markt 
verstehen. Diese simple Gleichung fand in der Praxis jedoch bisher keine Umsetzung mit einem 
eingeschränkten Wettbewerb auf dem Energiemarkt. Marktstruktur wurde als einer der 
entscheidenden Faktoren identifiziert, vor allem die Beteiligung des Staates in Energiekonzernen 
in Tschechien und der Slowakei, wodurch die Industrie stark geprägt wird. In der vorliegenden 
Arbeit wurde eine Evaluierung der Macht auf den Märkten vorgenommen, wobei die zu 
untersuchenden Objekte anhand ihres Marktanteil und Konsumentenverhalten untersucht 
wurden. Dadurch kann festgestellt werden, ob die beobachteten Preise dem freien Marktpreis 
entsprechen. Des Weiteren wurde eine zweiteilige Analyse durchgeführt die sich im ersten Teil 
auf den  nicht regulierte und im zweiten Teil auf den regulierten Teil des Preises fokussiert. Für 
Großhandelspreise ist ein transparenter und funktionierender Markt essenziel, was durch die 
Einführung von „market coupling‟ im dritten Quartal von 2009 sichergestellt wurde. Eine weitere 
Datenanalyse bietet einen Einblick auf die Effektivität des Market-couplings und stellt fest, dass 
der deregulierte Teil des Preises mit dem freien Marktpreis konvergiert. Im Gegensatz, die 
Gebühren, welche den Endpreis bilden sind ineffektiv fixiert und sind für die beobachteten 
Preisunterschiede verantwortlich.   
 
 
Schlüsselworte: Elektrizitätsversorgung, Energiepreise, Liberalisierung, Market-coupling 
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2. Introduction 
 
 In the past decade there have been several strong initiatives that forced electricity markets to 
undergo major structural changes. Formerly vertically integrated monopolies were split into legal 
entities to ensure separation of transmission and distribution from production and trade. These 
changes follow one ultimate goal which is higher competition in electricity markets that would 
dilute market power of incumbents, lead to higher energy efficiency in production and 
competitive prices for the customers. Through this long term social benefits could be achieved 
where a proper part of these benefits would be shared with end consumers
1
. The competition can 
be intensified and market power of dominant players decreased by extension of the respective 
markets due to which creation of internal European energy market was commenced. Integrated 
energy markets across the European Union would translate into the freedom of customers to 
choose from suppliers not only on domestic markets but internationally as well without losing 
power supply security.  
 Liberalization in Czech Republic and Slovakia proceeded somehow unequally despite similar 
starting position. Both countries went from planned economy with regulated prices to the market 
model and underwent waves of privatization in the electricity sector. These two countries also 
share a special position within European Union since they used to be a single state and even after 
separation in 1993 enjoyed superior economic cooperation. In addition to that their transmission 
network was built as one and therefore there should be sufficient transfer capacity on the cross-
border profile, enabling efficient trading and price arbitrage that would under optimal 
circumstances lead to price equalization. Nevertheless the statistics on household prices show 
significant differences between these two historically and economically interconnected countries.  
 There are several aspects that would explain this features. One explanation would be that 
Czech Republic was more successful in the process of liberalization, has a more open market 
with higher competition that pressures the profit margins down which in turn means cheaper 
electricity price for households. Secondly, this difference could suggest that Czech Republic in 
general is able to produce cheaper electricity by utilization of their endowments like coal or 
nuclear energy and the differences in price reflect the diverse structure of energy mix of these 
                                                          
1
 Joskow, 2008, 11 
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countries. On the other hand, differences could also result from different stages of market 
liberalization that were actually achieved. Finally, price difference between these countries could 
also suggest that the international electricity trading is insufficient, suffering from congestion or 
exercise of market power which disables arbitrage and following equalization of prices.  
 This thesis wants to provide more insight on whether the current situation in Czech Republic 
and Slovakia corresponds with the principles of liberalizes market and identify the major 
differences that impact final household electricity prices. The two, very connected research 
questions of this master thesis are as follows: 
 
 What factors cause the differences in final household electricity prices between Czech 
Republic and Slovakia?  
 What country-specific factors determine the development of prices? 
 
In this thesis and analysis of wholesale electricity prices and the market structure is conducted in 
order to identify the sources and reasons behind different household electricity prices, focusing 
mainly on the assumptions made above. The data used for the research are publicly available 
data from regulatory offices, transmission network operators and official short term market 
operator in Czech Republic, unless stated otherwise.  
 The first chapter provides a summary of the most important concepts related to liberalization 
and describe the process on the example of Czech Republic and Slovakia. Next the thesis 
provides an overview on market structure and energy mix in respective countries. Chapter five 
evaluates the concentration of the industry and potential for market power based on market share 
of market subjects, identification of incumbents, independence from the state and analyses 
switching behavior of customers in order to determine their responsiveness.  
 In the next part focus is on prices. In chapter six creation of wholesale prices is explained, 
including intra-state and cross-border trading. It explains and lists in praxis observed cases of 
assignment of transfer capacity and goes on to explain market coupling and congestion 
management in Czech Republic and Slovakia. With the help of descriptive statistics we examine 
empirical data in order to confirm or refuse hypotheses based on which we determine the level of 
efficiency of market coupling. In chapter eight we calculate based on the information provided 
by energy regulators and subsequently analyze regulated fees and charges in respective 
9 
 
countries. We compare them in order to explain price differences between the examined 
countries. At the end of the thesis we provide a conclusion and a short summary of our findings 
and the answer to our research question.  
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3. Key concepts  
3.1. Liberalization 
Liberalization in Europe did concentrate on market openness rather than on complex design 
of electricity markets. The electricity liberalization in Europe drifted away from the textbook 
model mainly due to more difficult coordination on European level among all member countries. 
The focus here was on retail competition
2
 meaning the freedom of customers to choose their 
supplier.  However as it was recognized, a meaningful degree of retail competition cannot be 
achieved, unless there is a well functioning wholesale market, network access and pricing 
institution that would enable customers to take advantage of this freedom. The end result of the 
ongoing process should be efficient retail and wholesale markets with distribution and 
transmission remaining regulated as legal monopolies
3
. Liberalization alone does not necessarily 
need to result in lower prices. In some countries the regulated prices were inefficiently low and 
therefore the actual prices after liberalization should be high enough to encourage investments 
and discourage wasteful consumption
4
. On the other hand open markets should foster 
competition which dilutes market power of incumbent, in result of which the price-cost margin 
should decrease benefits the final customer.  
 Liberalization in Europe is a top down process. Member states follow directives of the 
European Union in form of so called “liberalization packages” which describe a group of 
Directories and Policies that are to be adapted on national level. Then the member states are 
obliged to change their legislation accordingly, so that it corresponds with the principles of the 
European policies. The first wave of liberalization – the first liberalization package - in 1998 
aimed to unite the energy legislation of member states and lay the basis for further integration.  
 The second liberalization package (Directives of 2003) required the legal and functional 
unbundling of distribution system operators (DSOs) with more than 100,000 customers and 
transmission system operators (TSOs) by 1st of July 2007
5
. The legal unbundling should prevent 
inter-company subsidies that would also impede fair competition. The new role of DSOs was to 
serve as a neutral market facilitator of retail competition, which should ensure non-
                                                          
2
 Ibid., 20 
3
 Ibid., 11 
4
 Ibid., 15 
5
 http://www.euractiv.com/en/energy/liberalising-eu-energy-sector/article-145320 
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discrimination access to networks that broke down the entry barrier for retail suppliers and foster 
competition.  
 Third party access should have led to more market entries and more providers. Realization of 
this goal automatically suggests more competitive environment and as a result of this lower 
electricity prices for consumers. This step, along with the right energy policy should also lead to 
more alternative providers and a higher share of renewable resources of energy in the energy mix 
of the country. Retail competition is supposed to allow customers to choose among retail service 
providers the one who best meets their price/service requirements
6
. Before, protected customers 
(individuals or companies) had the right to access to a distribution system and to electricity 
supplies of certain quality for regulated fees. After liberalization entered into effectiveness, 
protected customers became authorized customers, who had by law the right to enter into 
contract with an electricity supplier of one‟s choice. 
 The third liberalization package whose implementation was supposed to finish not later than 
in the beginning of March 2011 but was postponed by all member states, aims to amend the rules 
to achieve better coordination and cooperation between member states. The third package 
implements physical unbundling where the ownership of distribution grid becomes independent 
from final supply entities. There are several possibilities how to achieve this and member states 
have the freedom to choose the form of this separation. 
 
3.1.1. Implementation in Czech Republic 
In the past, before market liberalization, energy prices were determined by the Czech 
regulator the Energy regulatory office. Liberalization turned a “protected customer” into an 
“entitled customer” who has the right and responsibility to choose his or hers electricity supplier.  
The liberalization of electricity market in Czech Republic follows the European initiative and 
preceded step-wise: 
 From 1.1. 2002 – customers with yearly consumption from 40 GWh  
 From 1.1. 2003 – customers with yearly consumption from 9 GWh 
 From 1.1. 2004 – all industrial customers with automatic meter reading 
                                                          
6
 Joskow, 2008, 11 
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 From 1.1. 2005 – all industrial customers except households 
 From 1.1. 2006 – all customers including households 
As of 2011 all end users have the possibility to switch their supplier of electricity free of charge. 
 
3.1.2. Implementation in Slovak republic 
 On January 1
st
, 2005 the Act no.: 656/2004 Coll. set the legal framework for liberalization, 
which also meant that companies became “authorized customers” and the market started to open. 
Households could change to their supplier of choice from July 1
st
 2007 which de facto meant 
liberalization of the market.  
3.2. Creation of integrated European electricity market 
 The current initiatives of European Union aim to gradually create an open and integrated 
European electricity market. It would mean that while national competition is being encouraged 
by open markets, the potential market power of national incumbents is threatened and mitigated 
by foreign competition. Therefore a successful interconnection management is needed, along 
with cooperation of cross-border congestion management among countries. The basic argument 
here is that an integrated market would give companies the possibility to benefit from economies 
of scale on one hand and decrease the concentration and market power potential on the other 
hand
7
. Also, customers would not be locally restrained but could freely choose a supplier – 
whether national or foreign. The effects of integrated markets could be summarized into: 
- equalization of prices 
- exercise of market power is hindered8 
 Simply put, in order to integrate the European electricity market, regional markets must be 
integrated as well. There are several regions in which markets are fairly integrated: e.g. Nordpool 
– the oldest and best known example of electricity markets integration in the Nordic countries. 
                                                          
7
 Bergman, 2009, 10 
8
 Ibid., 12 
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Gradually more regions follow the example of Nordpool, namely Benelux countries, Germany 
and Denmark, Spain and Portugal and most recently Czech Republic and Slovakia. 
 Market coupling in Czech Republic and Slovakia can be perceived as the next step towards 
internal energy market and a mean of competition development. In the ideal case companies are 
not locally restricted as neither are customers, prices converge and effective location of 
production results. The achievement of these goals remains vague. To which extent are the above 
mentioned effects present on Czech and Slovak markets along with necessary market structure 
will be evaluated in detail in the following chapters. Whether integration of Czech and Slovak 
electricity markets succeeded is an important factor in the price determination and could explain 
observed differences in prices. 
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4. Market structure 
4.1. Czech Republic 
4.1.1. Legal framework 
 Electricity market in Czech Republic follows the Act No. 458/2000 Coll. on business 
conditions and public administration in the energy sectors and on amendment to other laws (the 
"Energy Act")
9
. The Act is based on directives of the European Union, mainly Directive No. 
2003/54/ES concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity.  
4.1.2. Market subjects 
1) Generation – power plants 
 
Czech Republic has two nuclear power plants, one in Dukovany and one in Temelin, both are 
operated by the Czech state-controlled utility giant ČEZ, a.s.10. ČEZ is at the same time the 
largest electricity generator on the market, with a share of 75% in electricity generation in 
2010
11
. State owns 69.78% (in 2010) of all equity
12
, which makes the Czech government the 
majority shareholder. There is a very low ownership on the account of foreign investors, larger 
shareholders are banks – Unicredit Bank Czech Republic with 9.4% shares followed by Citibank 
Europe Plc with 5.35% and CSOB with 3.5%. Aside from ČEZ there are local Czech generators, 
Dalkia, E.On and RWE are present on the market as well.  
 
2) Transmission system operator 
 
The role of TSO in Czech Republic is executed by ČEPS, which is fully state owned company13.  
Formerly it was established as a 100% daughter company of ČEZ, but due to legislation changes 
                                                          
9
 http://www.eru.cz/dias-browse_articles.php?parentId=202&deep=off&type= 
10
 http://www.cez.cz/cs/vyroba-elektriny/jaderna-energetika.html 
11
 http://www.energostat.cz/velka-majetkova-transakce-na-energetickem-trhu-cr.html 
12
 http://www.cez.cz/en/cez-group/cez/structure-of-shareholders.html 
13
 CEPS Annual Report 2010, 25 
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went under the ownership of Czech ministries. Its main role is ensuring electricity transmission, 
balance of the system and maintenance and development of the network
14
.  
 
3) Distribution system operators 
 
Czech Republic is divided into three distribution regions, each of these regions is assigned to one 
distribution company. Distribution companies ensure operations of the network and distribute 
electricity to customers. They also direct the physical flows of electricity, measure consumption 
and have further competencies in order to ensure stability of the network. There are three 
primary distribution companies that were founded by incumbent electricity suppliers
15
: 
- E.ON Distribuce, a.s., serves southern regions 
- PREdistribuce, a.s., serves the area of Czech capital Prague 
- ČEZ Distribuce, a. s., serves the largest area, predominantly north and west regions 
 
Due to the ownership relations to their mother companies – who operate as final electricity 
suppliers – they are able to provide distribution tariffs for their mothers with lower profit 
margins than to alternative electricity suppliers. In this way they have certain power to make it 
more difficult to alternative suppliers to compete with incumbents. Aside from these 
conventional distributors, local distribution companies exist, predominantly in the proximity of 
larger industrial areas.  
 
4) Retailers 
 
Retailing companies are responsible for electricity supply to end customers. They can buy 
electricity directly from generators, via bilateral contracts or on the wholesale markets, e.g. 
Power Exchange Central Europe, European Energy Exchange in Leipzig. The biggest retailer 
remains to be CEZ, with 45% market share
16
. Prazska energetika (PRE) remains to be dominant 
in the Prague region, subsidies of European utility concerns of E.on and RWE are also present, 
along with alternative suppliers, e.g. Centropol Energy, BohemiaEnergy. 
                                                          
14
 http://www.ceps.cz/indexen.asp 
15
 ERU, Price Decision 2010  
16
 http://www.cez.cz/cs/pro-media/otazky-odpovedi/3.html 
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5) Short term electricity market operator 
 
Short market operator OTE is state owned and state-established company that is responsible for 
processing and reporting business balances of electricity. Furthermore it operates and balances 
short-term market in cooperation with the TSO, engages in market coupling, settles imbalances 
through regulating energy and also serves as the administrator of registry for greenhouse gas 
emission allowances trade.
17
 
 
7) Regulator Energy regulatory office  
 
Energy Regulatory Office issues licenses for restricted period of time for businesses in energy 
sector (distribution, retailing, buyer), oversees the activities of TSO, approves regulated fees 
such as transmission and distribution tariffs, sets limits for losses in transmission and distribution 
lines. It main objective is to create and foster an environment that is close to competition while 
not handicapping end-customers. It also manages, administrates and controls utilization of 
renewable sources of energy. Its correct operations are essential in order to ensure functioning of 
those spheres of energy sector where natural monopoly is still in place. 
4.2. Slovak Republic 
4.2.1. Legal framework   
 The legislation concerning electricity markets and prices is very complex and defined on 
several levels. Directives of European Union provide the legal basis that is common for all 
member states, this is amended by national legal norms. Most important are these:   
 Act No. 656/2004 on energy sector  
 Act No. 276/2001 on regulation of network industries  
 Regulation of the Government of the Slovak Republic No. 317/2007 Coll. determining 
the Energy Market rules effective from June 1, 2010 (market rules).  
                                                          
17
 http://www.ote-cr.cz/about-ote/main-reading 
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There is a specific provision in §14 of this Regulation that states that if an alternative 
electricity provider is incapable of fulfillment of its contractual responsibilities (e.g. 
electricity supply), the conventional retailer is to take over its responsibilities. This provision 
should ensure electricity supply security for households and industrial customers and should 
also contribute to better competitive environment.  
4.2.2. Market subjects 
1) Generation 
The market is dominated by single generation company - Slovenske elektrarne, former state-
owned monopoly. Slovenske elektrarne (SE), the biggest generation company in Slovakia with 
market share close to 84%, owns and manages a variety of power plants including both nuclear 
power plants and the biggest hydro power plant. National Property Fund of the Slovak Republic 
(representative of the state) with a share of 34% and by Enel, SpA of Italy holding a majority 
share of 66%
18
.  Unlike in Czech Republic, the state in this case does not hold the controlling 
majority and therefore does not unilaterally decide about the running of business. Historically 
there have been three regional electricity suppliers, who went through legal unbundling and the 
generating entities of these companies still own and run several power plants.  
2) Transmission system operator and market operator 
Since it is not rentable to build or operate multiple electricity grids distribution and transmission 
remain natural monopolies. The single transmission system operator (TSO) who manages and 
owns the transmission lines (high voltage 220 and 400kV) is a state-owned company Slovenská 
elektrizačná prenosová sústava, a.s. (SEPS). 
SEPS also executed the role of short-term market operator until the end of 2010, when its 
daughter company OKTE overtook the responsibilities for clearing and market organization from 
1.1.2011
19
. 
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 Slovenske Elektrarne, Annual Report 2010, 13 
19
 SEPS, Annual Report 2010, 27 
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3) Distribution system operators 
In the distribution system (medium voltage 110 kV and lower) there are three regional 
companies operating: ZSE – Distribúcia a.s. (western Slovakia), SSE – Distribúcia a.s. (central 
Slovakia) and Východoslovenská distribučná a.s. (eastern Slovakia), that were established as a 
result of unbundling of conventional electricity suppliers.  
4) Retailers   
Suppliers to end customers buy electricity from producers, or on wholesale markets and provide 
it to end customers. Conventional retailers who spawned from incumbents: ZSE – Energia a.s., 
SSE a.s., VSE a.s. are state-owned (with 51% of all shares), while remaining shares and voting 
rights were acquired by German E.ON Energie AG, French EDF and German RWE respectively. 
Aside from the dominant regional retailers there are minor or alternative electricity suppliers that 
entered the market as a result of liberalization efforts. The largest is ČEZ Slovensko, a subsidiary 
of the ČEZ - market leader in Czech Republic mentioned in the previous section. Others are for 
example Magna E.A., Lumius, Korlea Invest, Slovakia Energy, Coal Energy and A.En Slovakia. 
5) Regulator 
The regulatory institution in Slovak Republic is the Regulatory Office for Network Industries 
(URSO). ÚRSO overlooks the market conditions, regulates access to the network, determines the 
conditions, approves transmission and distribution fees, as well as fees for loses and system 
operation tariff in order to create and maintain a competitive environment.  
 There are several similarities between electricity markets since their legislation is strictly 
following directives of the European Union. The structure is almost identical with the exception 
of short term market organizer. Slovak republic did not have a short term market until the 
introduction of market coupling in September 2009. Another difference is in the presence and 
influence of the state in the industry. In Czech Republic the state is still the controlling 
shareholder of CEZ, which along with its daughter companies dominates several spheres of 
electricity markets from generation to distribution and end supply. A subsidy of CEZ in Slovakia 
is also the biggest alternative supplier. In Slovakia, the state is still controlling all distribution 
19 
 
companies, however has mild influence on the biggest generating company where the majority 
owner is a foreign investor – Italian utility giant Enel SpA. This ownership structure would 
suggest that while in both countries state remains the single most influence on business in 
electricity sector, in Czech Republic the state is directly more present than in its eastern 
neighbor.  
 The markets differ significantly in size. The market in Czech Republic is roughly double the 
size than Slovakia which is documented by statistics on net electricity consumption (see Table 1) 
Czech Republic is also a traditional exporter of electric energy whereas Slovak Republic is 
dependent on imports of electric energy in order to cover consumption. This state is projected to 
change in the future due to ongoing installments of capacity so that Slovak Republic could 
achieve a positive balance of production.   
Table 1: Annual net consumption 
Czech Republic                   
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Consumption net 53581 54781 56388 57664 59421 59752 60478 57112 59255 
Slovak Republic                   
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Consumption net 28674 28892 28682 28572 29624 29632 29830 27386 28761 
Source: based on annual reports of regulatory offices 
 
4.2. Energy mix 
There are also relatively significant differences in the energy mixes of both countries. 
The schemes representing energy mixes of the countries and their development over time can be 
found in Appendix 1 and Appendix 2. The differences in marginal costs of electricity production 
vary significantly, as illustrated in the graph below which represents variable costs of new 
generation sources in year 2016, as published by American Energy Information 
Administration
20
. Although these data are simply for illustration the differences in production 
costs of various fuels in energy mix could help explain and grasp the prices differences in 
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 http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/aeo/electricity_generation.html 
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between Czech Republic and Slovakia, given they in fact use remarkably cheaper energy 
sources. 
Figure 1: Approximate marginal of power generation by fuel 
Source: based on Energy Information Admission
21
  
 Czech Republic unlike Slovakia disposes of relatively large coal stocks and relies heavily on 
coal power plants. Coal power plants are the leading source of electric energy in the production. 
Coal power plants are cheap but produce relatively high carbon dioxide emissions. Slovakia has 
gradually moved away from the use of coal power plants as primary energy source and replaced 
them with gas and nuclear power plants
22
. Currently nuclear energy is the dominant source. The 
share of nuclear energy in the energy mix fluctuated around 55% in the past ten years. Such 
energy mix can be largely problematic for the future because of strong opposition from other 
European countries like Germany – who in connection of recent events in Japan and the nuclear 
catastrophe in Fukushima decided to shut down its nuclear plants - and also from neighboring 
Austria who is well-known opponent of nuclear energy. With the exception of hydro power both 
countries have relatively small share of renewable energy resources. Slovakia however is able to 
benefit from its water resources and produces approximately 20% in 2010 from large-scale hydro 
energy (see Appendix 2 for the representation of energy mix). From the point of CO2 emission 
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production has Slovakia a relatively better position than Czech Republic since it uses more hydro 
energy and relies less on fossil fuels. Nuclear energy also does not significantly contribute to 
CO2 emissions. Under the new environmental legislation coal becomes continually more 
expensive over time and less beneficial. This is why is Czech Republic considering further 
construction of additional units around nuclear power plant in Temelin after which should the 
share of nuclear energy rise from current 30% to approximately 50-60%
23
. 
Another major difference is the energy dependency of both countries. Slovakia is 100% 
dependent on the supplies of gas from Russia and other primary energy resources, which 
negatively influences the energy dependency. In regards to produced electric energy Slovak 
republic was a net exporter since 2007 but as a part of EU admission process it committed itself 
to decommission two reactor units of the nuclear power plant in Jaslovske Bohunice
24
 as of 
31.12.2008. Although the nuclear reactors adhere to safety and longevity criteria this decision 
was made under strong international political pressure. This decision translated into a need for 
electric energy import, mainly from Czech Republic, influenced the growth of high voltage 
prices and triggered issues with reserve power for grid
25
. Depending on the development of 
national consumption, Slovakia could acquire the exporting position again in the future. Further 
units of the nuclear power plant in Mochovce are planned to by installed and another installation 
of a power plant in strategic cooperation with ČEZ should take place in the future. The projects 
should be finished and connected to the power grid by 2013 and 2020 respectively. Czech 
Republic is a net exporter but due to projected shut downs of obsolete and nuclear units is 
expected to lose its position around 2014 to 2019
26
.  Energy dependency calculated as imports 
divided by total consumption is 64% for Slovakia and 28% in the case of Czech Republic
27
 
which reflects current situation. 
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4.3. Renewable sources of energy 
4.3.1. Czech Republic 
 Both countries have a relatively small percentage of renewable energy source (hereinafter 
“RES”) in their energy mix28 which reaches approximately 8%29.Wind energy has gradually 
gained importance and weight in share of renewable energy sources in Czech Republic. Wind 
energy represents approximately 50% of RES followed by photovoltaic sources. According the 
recently published press report
30
 there has been a major increase in the amount of installed 
photovoltaic capacity, mainly due to the promotional efforts from the government and relatively 
higher price for electrical energy coming from this source.  At the end of February 2011 the total 
installed capacity of photovoltaic sources was 1900 MW, which accounts for a rapid increase of 
1400MW from 2009. Czech Republic also employs energy sources from biomass, these however 
have minor share (103MW) on total production.  
4.3.2. Slovakia 
 The situation is quite different in Slovakia where hydropower remains to be the mostly used 
RES. Biomass – although it has relatively high potential that has yet not been tapped – and wind 
energy constitutes a very small share of the whole portfolio. The legislative has been perceived 
as relatively hindering with the price of energy from RES still remaining a factor
31
. Another 
obstacle were concerns for the stability of electricity grid since energy from wind and solar 
power is more difficult to predict. With the change of government and similarly as in Czech 
Republic a boom of solar collectors could be observed along with the favorable government 
policy for this kind of resource. In Slovakia the installed capacity of photovoltaic as of mid 2011 
is 480 MW which already exceeded the strategic energy plan of 300MW for Slovakia
32
. Wind 
energy and use of biomass still remain underdeveloped.  
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5. Competitiveness of markets 
 Current debate widely recognizes the need of competition in historically monopoly-operated 
energy sector. While certain attributes of electric energy – distribution and transmission – are 
due to high construction and coordination cost still considered natural monopolies, European 
Union member states encourage competition in generation and retail market. New market 
entrants can compete thanks to their flexibility
33
 that enables them to purchase cheaper base load 
electricity. In addition to that they operate with lower overhead costs which translate into 
cheaper electricity for end customers.  
 Energy sector is very specific due to high entry costs and price inelasticity of customers. 
High entry cost were targeted by the second and third liberalization package, that gradually 
required functional, legal and finally physical unbundling. Under this legislation alternative 
providers of electric energy have under certain cases guaranteed access to energy grid. 
Distribution networks are now operated separately and can therefore be also sourcing energy 
from minor energy generators. Despite this arrangement incumbents remain dominant. The 
structure of energy markets still resembles oligopoly
34
 which proves certain improvement 
towards perfect competition. In generation incumbents tend to be protected by high entry 
barriers, in retail markets are these rather insignificant.
35
 End consumers typically do not have 
the relevant information in real time and also are rather rigid in electricity consumption, 
especially in the short term.  Retailers are therefore usually protected by the immobility of 
customers who are reluctant due to perceived switching cost. In perfect competition the margin 
between wholesale and retail prices would reflect only the cost of distribution metering, billing 
and general services to retail customers
36
  
5.1. Measures of market power 
 As previously mentioned liberalization failed if market power of incumbents did not decrease 
in the process. This part of the thesis provides an analysis of the market structure with respect to 
the potential of market power.  
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There are several indicators of potential market power. One of the measures is Residual Supply 
Index which measures “to what extent the competitors of a given generator, as a group, can meet 
the current demand
37.” If these generators are able to supply 100 percent and more of the 
demand, the examined generator is not pivotal and does not have market power. However if the 
cumulative capacity of the rest of the industry is not sufficient to meet the demand, the generator 
in question can influence market prices.  Another measure is Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) 
which is defined as “the sum of the squares of the market shares, in percent, of all firms in the 
market.”38  
 The goal of this section is not to calculate the relevant indexes due to the unavailability of 
relevant data. However the following analysis will use criteria that are relevant for above 
mentioned measures with the focus of concentration in the industry. It also must be noted that 
high degree of concentration is sufficient for market power problems to arise, however these can 
be present also when small generators are pivotal to the market. Although purely company‟s size 
is not necessarily decisive factor, it is - along with market share of conventional providers - the 
best approximation for market power potential. Furthermore the number of changes of suppliers 
and the presence of alternative providers is considered a sign of functioning liberalized market 
and price competition. 
 
5.2. Concentration of industries 
5.2.1. Czech Republic 
 There are no official data publicly available for Czech Republic. The web site of CEZ lists 
the market share of 45%
39
 The CEO of Prazska energetika (PRE) listed the market share to be 
“around 11%40”. The distribution area of PRE is mainly the area of Czech capital Prague and 
surroundings, where the company services 80% of the market
41
. E.on lists the market share to be 
20%
42
. The most recent available information from 2007 say that these traditional companies 
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service 95% of final customers‟ total consumption; in the case of small customers which includes 
households, their share is more than 99%
43
. Up to date there are 21 suppliers of electric energy 
total, which is almost double the amount from 2007. CEZ is a former monopoly which is also 
currently owned by state. European commission is conducting an investigation for alleged 
competition hindering practices, as of August 2011
44
. Judging from the concentration of the 
Czech electricity market, incumbent suppliers remain very strong which would implicate market 
power potential. Data on supplier changes are analyses next in order to gain more insight in the 
degree of competitiveness of markets. 
 
5.2.2. Slovakia 
 Markets share of incumbents (ZSE, SSE, VSE) is sinking, as the report of URSO regulator 
shows. In 2008 their cumulative market share reached 57,7%, 56,4% in 2009 and 52,1% in 
2010
45
. In this regard the unbundling and liberalization was effective in dilution of market 
concentration since almost 50% of the market in Slovakia is serviced by alternative suppliers. 
More problematic is the structure in generation where Slovenske elektrarne (SE) maintain 84% 
market share, with numerous small, predominantly local generators. However there is relatively 
large share of hydropower in Slovak energy mix. Hydropower is specific in the aspect, that it is 
storable to certain level. This feature decreases the probability of market power exercise
46
 since 
it can be supplied to energy grid during peak hours when the generation is running at its full 
capacity. 
5.3. Customer behavior – switching  
5.3.1 Czech Republic 
 In Czech Republic it was possible for households to switch their energy provider from the 
beginning of year 2006, however only relatively small amount of households – 4,976 – did so in 
the same year. Switching of households rose gradually and soared in 2010 where nearly 91,466 
households changed their supplier. Industrial customers were more numerous, switched earlier 
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and more in the sum. Taking into account the number of private households in Czech Republic, 
as officially stated in EUROSTAT (Number of private households 4,216,085) this corresponds to 
a switching rate of 5.9%. The numbers of 2011 are preliminary (published as a news release by 
the market operator OTE), however report an exponential growth that is represented by double 
the amount of customers switching their supplier in the first six months of 2011 than in the 
previous year. In Czech Republic, customers‟ reaction is relatively slow coming 4 years after the 
first introduction of the possibility of switching, which can be connected to resolution of issues 
and higher presence of alternative providers.  
 Although legally there is no switching fee, in reality some alternative suppliers charge a so 
called “activation fee” which depends on the company, chosen tariff and annual consumption47. 
It can be as high as 600 KC
48
 (approx. €25). In order to balance this fee out, they provide special 
offers where for example there is a fixed price for electricity from 1.1. to 31.12. of the respective 
year, or a floating price which linked to prices on wholesale markets and changes on monthly 
basis. ČEZ offers a possibility to purchase electricity for a whole year ahead49. 
Figure 2: Total annual changes of supplier – households in Czech Republic 
 
Source: annual report of Energy Regulatory Office
50
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5.3.2. Slovakia 
 From 1
st 
of July 2007 every customer has the freedom to choose their electricity supplier, 
with price being one of the important factors. The reaction in Slovakia was even slower than in 
its western neighbor when in the first year of fully liberalized markets only 1 household changed 
its supplier. Consumers started to respond to this possibility in larger extent two years later, 
while the numbers in 2010 reached double the level from previous year.  
 There have been several issues from the beginning and remain negatively influencing the 
willingness of customers to switch their supplier. One of the main concerns of customers, which 
explain why most customers remain with their supplier, is energy supply stability, lack of service 
quality, payment and technical competencies, overall riskiness and rating, flexibility of amount, 
capacity, customer and technical service etc.  
 
Figure 3: Total annual changes of supplier by type of customer - Slovakia 
Source: Based on annual reports of the regulatory office (URSO) 
5.3.3. Reasons for a change 
 Customers consider several aspects when switching, besides electricity price also quality of 
customer service (consulting, approach, individual offer, term conditions, complex supply and 
distribution services etc.). The regulatory office believes that majority of firms have set their 
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tariffs inefficiently and incompatibly
51
, which generates addition costs and makes firms less 
competitive. 
5.3.4. Best practices of liberalized markets 
 The best case can be currently observed in Norway
52
. The features of the policies that 
contributed to high level of competition in the retail market are as follows: 
• Free entry on the supplier side 
• Low degree of supplier concentration 
• Transparent prices and conditions for electricity offered 
• Free choice of supplier and contracts 
• No charge for switching supplier 
 
 The design of Czech and Slovak retail market is very similar. The entry on the supplier side 
is only hindered by initial capital costs, but is not restricted which can be also documented by the 
switching rate and rise of alternative providers. Information on prices is publicly available (on 
power exchange in Prague), there are several online calculators that make it easy and quick to 
compare available offers and calculate the cost. There is no charge for switching supplier, 
although one fraction to this prerequisite is the activation fee in Czech Republic. Regarding 
supplier concentration both in Czech Republic and Slovakia there are regionally present 
incumbents who remain strong. In order to further support effective functioning of electricity 
markets, it is necessary that
53
:  
– the process of supplier change is kept simple 
– suppliers adhere to technical standards since there have been repeated problems with their 
competencies and readiness as well as problems with electrical data exchange 
– prevent from misuse of dominant market position, false advertising and dishonest 
practices of direct selling, when the sales force uses inaccurate information in effort to 
sign as many customers as possible 
– availability of information of customers is sufficient 
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Liberalization in Czech Republic and Slovakia meant privatization of former state owned 
monopolies whereas these were acquired by foreign investors. In the case of Slovak distribution 
companies, these are partially owned by foreign investors (RWE, E.on, EDF), who hold 49%. 
Enel SpA also controls the dominant generator Slovenske Elektrarne. The Czech provider ČEZ is 
dominant in domestic market and increasing in importance in the Slovak. Although numbers 
show that incumbents were losing market share the possibility of foreign investors to acquire 
shares enabled the biggest energetic companies to extent their portfolio and penetrate markets 
that were up to that point completely closed and serviced by national monopolies. In fact, as the 
market share in the relevant national market decreases the presence of energetic giants across the 
internal European market increases making them more influential in the whole European market. 
 
 The concentration is a good approximate for market power. However it is highly vague to 
conclude, whether the potential for market power exercise really leads to distortion of market 
competition. Market power can be beneficial under certain circumstances. The structural 
characteristics alone, “indicate potential market power rather than the actual exercise of market 
power”. Concentration of sellers must be accompanied by entry barriers for the incumbents to be 
able to exercise of market power over long periods and low price elasticity of demand. We have 
seen that Czech and Slovak customers are slow in reaction and do not respond immediately to 
rising prices by change of supplier. However market competition does not necessarily have to be 
hindered if concentration increases but small generators are able to compete. By definition lower 
competition leads to higher mark-ups, which in turn attract more market entries. If the entry costs 
are low enough, in long term period the concentration should decrease.  
 
 Although the structure in both countries is very similar the major difference lies in the role of 
state / government in the industry. In Czech Republic CEZ remains to be state owned and 
controlled with largest distribution area (which is also disproportional to the other distribution 
areas) and therefore major influence on the market. As previously mentioned, market power can 
be exercised if there is not sufficient capacity for cross border trading, elimination of domestic 
competition alone is not sufficient. However this relates only to wholesale prices which are 
determined by the market. Regulated fees – mainly fees for distribution which constitute the 
largest part of regulated fees - are determined by governmental offices and therefore are intact by 
30 
 
competitive environment In this case the engagement of the state in the industry, where it also 
controls e.g. fees for distribution which are strictly local, plays a significant role. In the next 
chapter we will analyze the data on electricity prices, including regulated fees and deregulated 
prices of active energy in order to identify crucial factors that determine different electricity 
prices for households. 
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6. Electricity price 
 The prices of electric power in Czech Republic and Slovakia have been different. There are 
differences in the retail price for end customers as well as in the wholesale price on the spot 
market. The data represented in the Figure 4 below refer to average electricity prices free of 
value added tax for households with average annual consumption between 2500 MWh and 5000 
MWh, as reported by EUROSTAT. Most statistics available in the annual reports by Czech and 
Slovak regulatory offices and annual report of their TSOs use a model household with lower 
annual consumption of below 2500 MWh. While Czech Republic does not reach the price level 
of Euro area, Slovak prices have exceeded the European average in year 2005 and have been 
copying this trend also in the following years.  
Figure 4: Average national electricity price for households (annual consumption 2500-5000MWh) 
 
Source: EUROSTAT 
 Prices in both countries are continually rising despite ongoing liberalization of energy 
markets whereas this trend is copying the development of primary resources prices, like oil and 
natural gas on world markets. What is surprising is the price difference, which is somewhat 
significant, between historically connected economies of Czech Republic and Slovakia. In the 
following chapters author aims to target and explain the difference of prices based on analysis of  
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generation costs (energy mix) influencing wholesale prices, fees and surcharges for transmission 
and distribution influencing retail prices and competitiveness of markets which influences the 
final mark-up.  
The final price of electricity for the customer consists of what can be divided into two very 
specific parts
54
: 
1) the price of active energy – including generator‟s profit margin, also considered the wholesale 
price – which is not regulated and depends on cost of generation (therefore are influenced by 
energy mix and naturally type of source used). 
In Czech Republic this accounts for 40-60% of final price of electricity supply (depending on 
yearly consumption and customer category). In Slovakia this is approximately 50% of the final 
price
55
. Base load electricity is traded on wholesale markets (like Power Exchange Central 
Europe– PXE - or EEX in Germany) and responds to demand and supply at the markets. The 
final suppliers (either traditional or alternative) are able to buy their electricity either directly 
from the generator on contractual base, or to buy it on wholesale markets, like PXE. There are 
several possibilities how to set up a tariff. There can be a single tariff where the electricity price 
for customer stays the same throughout the whole day. Another possibility is to have different 
time of day tariff: different tariff during day (peak) and during night (off- peak); low or high 
tariff etc. 
 
2) regulated fees and charges, that are on yearly basis determined by the regulatory offices – 
ERU in Czech Republic and URSO in Slovakia. The structure of fees is rather complex and 
although very similar for both countries, it differs in the principle by which the fees are grouped 
into charges paid by the final customer for electricity supply.   
 
In this regard, the market is liberalized. The only exception from market price creation were in 
year 2010 customers with annual consumption lower than 30MWh. In this case the Regulatory 
Office for Network Industries set the final price
56
. 
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7. Wholesale prices  
 Electric energy is very specific due to the lack of storability. This feature calls for strong 
coordination among market subjects and increases the complexity of challenges the liberalization 
of European markets faces
57
.  The overall goal of EU is to create one internal electricity market. 
This would mean that any customer is free to choose her supplier and is not limited by location 
or the country borders, which delivers higher variation and more choice between offers. This 
arrangement would mean higher cross border competition, higher cross border trading
58
. 
Ultimately, it facilitates arbitrage which leads to equalization of prices and fosters production 
efficiencies. 
 Integrated European market is facing several challenges with one being the physical 
constraints on cross boarder transmission capacity. In most cases were these capacities designed 
to ensure stability of transmission network in respective countries and security of delivery. The 
very restricted possibilities of electricity storage also mean that there must be equality between 
produced and consumed electric energy and any given point in time. For this, existence of spot 
markets are essential, where residual electricity can be traded and regulating energy purchased, 
in order to keep balance between generation and load. Market prices then contain information 
and serve as a clearing tool. 
7.1. Power exchanges 
 There are two power exchanges that are relevant for wholesale prices in Czech Republic and 
Slovakia – Power Exchange (hereinafter “PXE”) in Prague and more liquid German European 
Energy Exchange (hereinafter “EEX”). Power exchange in Prague is 100% subsidy of Prague 
stock exchange and was established in January 2007. The trading with Czech electricity started 
more than half a year later in July 2007. Under liberalization and integration tendencies, Slovak 
electricity began to be traded in October 2008 followed half a year later by Hungarian 
electricity
59
. PXE remains to be the reference framework for wholesale prices in the Central 
European Region. Except physical assets there are also financial assets – financial futures – 
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being traded as of February 1st, 2010. Futures remain to be the most significant product traded 
on PXE – in 2010 amount of traded futures reached 24.3 million MWh, whereas the spot market 
accounted for only 83.8 thousand MWh
60
.  
 The German European Energy Exchange is based in Leipzig, Germany and is a reference 
exchange for wholesale electricity prices for PXE and central European region. It was 
established in 2002 after merger of exchanges in Leipzig and Frankfurt in an effort to create a 
single marketplace
61
. Currently electricity (day ahead and intraday trading), natural gas, emission 
rights (day-ahead trading) as well as respective financial derivates (futures and options) are being 
traded on EEX. 
 
Short term electricity markets can be divided into
62
: 
- Block market63 involves trading blocks of different types: base (0:00–24:00), peak (8:00–
20:00) and off-peak (0:00–8:00; 20:00–24:00). The trading starts 5 days before delivery 
and closes at 13:00 one day before the delivery (which corresponds with the deadline for 
closing bilateral trading.). Enables continuous trading. 
 
- Day-ahead market – market subjects trade on day D-1 or D-2 capacity or volumes for day 
D. The shortest trading period in Czech Republic is one hour – this enables market 
subject to trade for each hour of the days which translates into 24 markets.  
 
- Intraday market – usually after closing day ahead markets for the respective day, intraday 
market opens (in Czech Republic as of 2009 this trading opens at 3 p.m. the day before
64
) 
which enables the market subjects to trade anonymously volumes for the same day. 
Intraday market closes latest hours or minutes before realization of the contract (e.g. 
delivery of electric energy, in Czech Republic the deadline is 1.5 hours ahead). 
 
 
 
                                                          
60
 Annual Report Prague Stock Exchange 2010, 36 
61
 http://www.eex.com/en/EEX/EEX%20AG 
62
 Chemisineč, 2010, 45 
63
 OTE, Technical Report 2010, 57 
64
 OTE, Technical Report 2008, 30 
35 
 
In Czech Republic, following trading tools are used
65
:  
- Bilateral trading (including exchange intra-state contracts) 
- Organized short-term market 
o block market 
o day-ahead spot market 
o intra-day market 
 
In 2010 more than 97% of electricity was traded in form of bilateral contracts
66
, these include 
traditional and exchange intra-state contracts, as well as contracts for import and export. The role 
of market operator is exercised by OTE a.s.  There has been a significant increase in traffic 
especially on the intraday market in connection with the increase of unpredictable RES in the 
energy share. OTE reports
67
 that trading volume from January to March 2011 increased 5 times 
in comparison with the same period of previous year. This indicates development of the market, 
more activity among market subjects, increasing transparency, information value, relevance and 
liquidity. 
 
In Slovakia, the trade with electricity is very similar and can take these forms
68
:  
- over the counter bilateral trading – non-public,  
- brokerage platforms, mostly anonymous internet platform e.g. TFS, ICAP, GFI, Spectron 
or SPX 
- power exchange (EEX in Leipzig or less liquid PXE in Prague)  
- auction system – Czech Republic and Slovakia use market coupling to connect their day 
markets 
 
In 2010 approximately 8% of electrical energy was traded on wholesale market
69
 and fluctuates 
around 10% of total production. This numbers reflect the volatility of production from 
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hydropower and possible interruptions in production of other sources in the region.
70
. Until 
recently, there has been no organized marketplace in Slovakia. On 5.11.2008
71
 the transmission 
system operator SEPS was appointed to organize the short term and remained in this position 
until 1.1.2011 when a newly established entity OKTE took over. Because of the size and struggle 
with liquidity of the Slovak market daily import and export is inevitable.
72
 The market operator 
is also responsible for imbalance clearing. Imbalance is defined as the difference between the 
commitment supply electricity to the system and the commitment to take electricity from the 
system
73
. This is done in order to keep the system in balance at every given point in time. In case 
there is a negative imbalance (lack of energy), regulation electricity is supplied to the system by 
system operator. The cost of such additional energy is then born by the inflictor of negative 
imbalance. In case of positive imbalance, residual electricity that is not subjected to annual 
bilateral contracts is being traded on short term basis on intra-state spot market, foreign markets, 
mainly via brokerage platforms. The day-ahead market with electricity functioning as market 
coupling should be expanded to involve Hungarian market as well and connect with the 
regionally integrated market of Western Europe in the future.  
7.2. Cross border trading 
 Although relatively small percentage of electricity in Czech Republic and Slovakia is being 
traded on exchanges, this practice is essential for further development of competition and fair 
prices for end customers. The best practice in order to enable more competitive environment is to 
integrate regional markets that increase the geographical extent of the relevant market as 
previously seen in Nordic countries
74
 which in turn decreases concentration. More importantly it 
facilitates arbitrage and therefore price convergence, it enables market subjects to operate more 
efficiently. Especially for markets in Slovakia and Czech Republic the integration enables a 
trivial thing – profiting from economies of scale and availability of natural resources that are 
limited in the other country. European Market Coupling Company (EMCC), company operating 
in central Western Europe that allocates cross border capacities in implicit auctions, states that 
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the benefits of cross-border competition 
75
 to be the maximization of total economic surplus of 
all participants. Since prices are based on where demand meets supply, fair and competitive 
prices serve as signaling tools to both customers and producers and enhances efficient 
consumption and production.   
 Arbitrage takes place when there are price differences in participating countries. While 
arbitrage is highly desirable, it can have counterproductive effects as well. By definition it only 
increases welfare if the incumbent does not significantly restrict supply, which is not the case of 
electricity markets because of the restricted transmission capacity.
76
 In this particular case it 
allows the arbitrageurs to trade electricity from the low-price region to the high-price region 
which improves the allocation efficiency among end users but decreases production efficiency 
since it shifts production to the high-price region
77
. Ability of incumbents to exercise market 
power plays a decisive role in determination, whether market coupling really leads to better 
allocation of resources and increase in welfare. Similar results are concluded by a study based on 
simulation of already partially integrated electricity markets in Benelux
78
. The question is which 
one of these effects – increase of allocation efficiency among customers or decrease of 
production efficiency prevails. To summarize the findings of previous studies this implies two 
important prerequisites for efficient arbitrage: 
 
1) market power of incumbent is broken down at least in one of the two markets
79
,  
2) interconnector capacity is large enough to allow arbitrage (via cross border trading) that would 
equalize the prices in adjacent countries
80
 
 
Due to condition number (2), the reduction of physical bottlenecks remains a necessary condition 
for market integration
81
.  
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7.2.1. Explicit auctions 
 Since the physical capacity of cross-border lines is very scarce the first attempt to assign this 
capacity in a transparent manner, in line with the principles of liberalization were explicit 
auctions
82
. These auctions were based on bilateral or multilateral agreements among neighboring 
transmission system operators (TSOs), where market subjects can auction off the available daily 
or hourly capacity. The disadvantage of explicit auction is that the market subjects must auction 
off the transmission capacity separately from the marketplace where actual electricity is 
bought/sold. In practice bids for the capacity auction are submitted before energy prices are 
posted on the stock exchange
83
. This practice results in separation of information about the prices 
on spot markets and can lead to inefficient utilization of the connectors when the acquired 
transmission capacity does not correspond with the actual physical cross border flow.  
7.2.2. Implicit auctions 
 This is the reason why implicit auctions were introduced where the market subject auction 
off the transmission capacity along with respective volumes of electric energy. There are several 
forms of implicit auctions implemented currently discussed below.  
7.2.2.1. Market splitting  
 If there is only on power exchange handling implicit auctions for all participating countries 
we describe this arrangement as market splitting. Market splitting is currently executed in e.g. 
Spain and Portugal (Iberian peninsula)
84
 and Nordpool
85
. In the Nordic region the transmission 
capacity is auctioned off on a day-ahead basis with the results incorporated in the following spot 
prices and trading. Main advantage of this arrangement is that there is only one entity managing 
the marketplace with one set of rules eliminating the risk of price or volume discrepancies, 
increasing information efficiency and social welfare. Because of these it is expected that 
European market, especially national markets who implemented price coupling, may evolve 
towards market splitting.  
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7.2.2.2. Market coupling 
 Further possibility is market coupling. Market coupling is currently executed in Netherlands-
Belgium-France, with plans to include Germany and Luxemburg in the near future.  This form of 
implicit auction was implemented in September 2009 between Czech Republic and Slovakia
86
. 
We differentiate price coupling and volume coupling. Under market coupling respective markets 
are handled by respective market organizers cooperate in organization of implicit auctions. 
Market operators use a market coupling algorithm. There are various mathematical approaches 
used in calculation of the optimal outcome and assignment of capacities. The more participant, 
the more complicated algorithms are being used 
 Price coupling includes all data and rules of participating exchanges and delivers volumes 
and flows between bidding areas based on the prices. Market splitting is commonly recognized 
and a form of price coupling
87
. The results of volume coupling are however only volumes and 
cross border flows between bidding regions. This information is then forwarded to the 
marketplace operator that calculates the prices and volumes for the respective part of the market. 
This method is associated with relatively higher risk. It takes certain amount of time when the 
market is waiting for the results of the first auction, the risk of price or volume discrepancies is 
higher which is accompanied by the risk of incorrect cross border flows. 
 
 Effective arbitrage allowing markets clear energy and transmission rights simultaneously at 
spatial level, however this is not the case currently in Europe
88
. Market coupling is considered 
the best approximate for such organization of markets, however embodies a major drawback. It 
provides a simplified representation of the electricity grid, based on which national power 
exchanges clear multi-national energy markets. This in turn creates incomplete market, since the 
traded volumes do not necessarily correspond with physical capacity. TSOs then, if any 
overflows arise, undertake counter-trading operations in order to rebalance the whole system 
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which is one way of dissolving the resulting congestions
89
. Within this means TSOs perform an 
arbitraging function.
90
  
7.2.2.3. Market coupling in Czech and Slovak Republic 
 Market coupling between Czech Republic and Slovakia is a response of the initiative of 
European market coupling company (hereinafter “EMCC”) and is fully in line with European 
legislation ((Regulation ES 1228/2003 and policy 2005/89/ES)
 91
. The energy trade between 
these countries has been historically very intense, with companies operating in both countries 
and with Czech Republic having the position of net exporter of electrical energy. The necessary 
condition for market coupling was the existence of marketplaces in both countries. While Czech 
Republic had established market organizer – OTE, a.s., in Slovakia the transmission system 
operator SEPS (Slovenská elektrizačná prenosová sústava) initially was authorized to exercise 
this role. The connection of Czech and Slovak markets is first of its kind in central and eastern 
European region.  
 The main improvement the established cooperation brings is the opportunity of market 
subjects to buy and sell electricity on both national markets. Resulting benefits from this 
organization of market is higher daily liquidity, higher accessibility, lower risk from trading 
electricity and transmission capacity separately. Slovak market subjects also acquire access to 
spot market with stabile levels of liquidity. The ultimate goal is to secure stability and security of 
both electricity markets. As a result there is one market price for electricity for both countries, 
taking into account the cross border transmission capacity. If there is not enough transmission 
capacity the prices on the market can differ.  
The main expected advantages of market coupling are: 
- Better utilization of cross border capacities, 
- Higher liquidity and transparency of spot markets, more clarity about price setting for 
customers, 
- Convergence of prices and lower volatility 
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- Elimination of speculative market operations  
- Elimination of risk resulting from separate bidding for electricity and for transmission 
rights (vacant capacity)  
7.2.2.4. Congestion management – CZ/SK profile 
 As previously mentioned allocation between Czech Republic and Slovakia runs via implicit 
auctions in cooperation with operators of the day-ahead electricity markets. Since 1. 1. 2010 the 
transfer capacity between these two countries were not allocated on annual/monthly basis but 
exclusively via auction. Market subject could submit their offers until 10 a.m. 2 days before the 
day of delivery
92
. The capacity of CZ/SK interconnector is sufficient for trading (transfer 
capacity 3x400kV and 2x220kV lines) however import to Czech Republic is limited due to 
bottlenecks within Czech network
93
. Congestion management is an integrated part of market 
coupling, however the interconnector itself does not seem to hindering cross border trading. One 
explanation is the fact, that the transmission network in Czech Republic and Slovakia was 
initially built as one single network, since these two countries used to be one state (until the split 
in 1993). Secondly, Kirchhoff‟s laws imply that flows will be split between parallel paths. Due to 
this the actual electricity flow will always be lower than the physical capacity enables
94
.  
Czech Republic, as major exporter of electric energy previously experienced congestions on 
German and Austrian border. Capacity on the ČEPSAPG (Austria) interconnector was allocated 
on a bilateral basis. The transfer capacity of other interconnectors is being auctioned off in 
Central Allocation Office in Freising, Germany. The Office organizes coordinated auctioned for 
five TSOs in the central European region: 50Hertz and transpower/TenneT (both in Germany), 
PSE Operator (Poland), SEPS (Slovakia) and ČEPS (Czech Republic)95. 
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7.3. Empirical evidence on market coupling in Czech Republic and 
Slovakia  
 Despite market coupling final electricity prices in examined countries differ. Under market 
coupling, wholesale day-ahead trading yields one price for Slovak and Czech market. The only 
situation where prices differ is the case of congestion. In case that the result of market coupling 
for Czech and Slovak markets is a physical flow of electricity that is insufficient, markets 
decouple: each market is evaluated separately with highest possible level of optimizing. In this 
case two different prices result with the higher price assigned to the importing region in 
respective period. The price difference times the total flow of electricity is then divided between 
system operators as a fee for management of bottlenecks
96
. The intuition behind different prices 
then would be that Slovakia, as importing country is experiencing higher prices during 
congestion periods which would explain the differences of final prices for customers. 
 Czech Republic and Slovakia should be able to benefit from the fact that while these two 
used to be one country – Czechoslovakia – in the past, the transmission lines were built as for 
one state. Reserved capacity according to the data from Czech market operator as high as 3100 
MW, however as SEPS reports, the interconnector itself is strong enough and the physical flows 
in 2009 were well beyond its capacity
97
. Nevertheless, actual data will be analyzed in order to 
determine how often “decoupling” followed by different prices appears, as result of insufficient 
cross-border transfer capacity. 
 
We examine three hypotheses: 
Hypothesis Nr.1: Congestion on the CZ/SK interface is rare, therefore markets can work 
effectively, cross border trading and resulting arbitrage is enabled  
Hypothesis Nr.2: Price volatility decreases after introduction of market coupling, since the 
relevant markets are extended, as a result liquidity increases. 
Hypothesis Nr.3: Considering market coupling Czech Republic is a net exporter of electrical 
energy to Slovakia. 
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7.3.1. Data 
 The data used for this purpose are publicly available data on prices and volumes published by 
the by Czech market organizer, OTE, a.s. on the official web site http://www.ote-
cr.cz/statistics/yearly-market-report?set_language=en. Available are hourly data on prices, 
volumes, prices, assigned and utilized cross-border capacity and profile price (in EUR/MWh) 
from 1.1.2009 to 30.7.2011. Also another set of data from the same source is used for 
computation of descriptive statistics for year 2008.  
 
7.3.2. Method 
 First, we will find out, how often market decoupled by identifying such events in the sample, 
when assigned capacity was fully utilized, although not necessarily resulted in different prices on 
Czech and Slovak markets. We compare data on “assigned capacity” with “utilized capacity” in 
Microsoft Office Excel program. The results should either confirm or refuse hypothesis #1. 
 
Furthermore descriptive statistics will be used in order to find evidence of efficiently functioning 
of the markets and verify hypothesis #2. One of the assumptions that we want to verify is 
whether price volatility decreased after trading was extended to larger geographical area and 
involved larger number of market participants. Volatility is calculated as standard deviation of 
respective daily average prices. Although we have hourly data available, we use daily averages 
in order to avoid bias since electricity prices are strongly seasonal (price electricity is lower at 
night, when the demand is usually very low and higher during day).  
 
 Similarly we use descriptive statistics to verify hypothesis #3. We determine hours and 
assign the characteristic – exporter or importer to respective country. We then determine which 
characteristic is prevailing for each country, based on the data from market coupling. 
Furthermore we examine average and total volumes traded and calculate the share of both 
countries on total trade. This will enable us to determine whether Czech Republic plays the role 
of electricity exporter also on the short term organized market.  
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7.3.3. Findings 
Observable market decoupling  
Based on the available data, the assigned capacity was fully used 12 times (which translates to 
only 12 hours) in 2009, 30 times in 2010. This state did not occur in the first six months of 2011. 
Despite the insufficient capacity and market decoupling, different prices were recorded only in 2 
cases out of 12 (in 2009) and 21 cases out of 30 (in 2010). Such situation can arise when the 
marginal price is determined based on the last accepted offer, with no follow up offer exists that 
would shift the price (in comparison to the price is exporting area). The results are summarized 
in Appendix 3. Judging from this evidence, market coupling does not suffer from physical 
constraints of cross-border interconnectors and contributes to efficient functioning of the 
markets. Hypothesis #1 can be confirmed. Market coupling between Czech Republic and 
Slovakia functions without any significant problems due to lack of capacity, arbitrage is enabled 
and fostered in this situation. 
 
Volatility 
Further we tried to verify the hypothesis #2 that market coupling leads to lower volatility in 
prices. We calculated standard deviation of average daily spot prices. In 2009 we divided the 
sample into 2 parts. Part one (noted 2009/1 in the table below) comprises before market coupling 
time period from January until August. Part two (noted 2009/2) comprises months September 
until December, when market coupling is already in effect. The results are summarized in the 
table below. We also analyzed available data for current year 2011 which comprises months 
January until June.  
 
Table 2: Standard deviation of market prices (volatility) 
  2008 2009/1 2009/2 2010 2011/1 
Czech Republic 18.4 10.71 10.02 8.92 7.6 
Annual decline   41.79% 45.54% 10.98% 14.80% 
Slovakia n/a n/a 10.59 8.88 7.6 
Annual decline n/a n/a n/a 16.15% 14.41% 
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Based on the evaluation of results, we can confirm hypothesis #2. Volatility declined by 45.54% 
in Czech Republic in the first three months of market coupling, compared to the previous year‟s 
level. The slight differences in the price volatility of both countries can be explained by different 
prices as a result of congestion and following market decoupling. 
  
Liquidity 
The impact of market coupling on the market is observable also in the increase of traded volume 
on the Czech day-ahead market and immediate liquidity. Market coupling became effective in 
the 36. week of 2009 which corresponds to the jump in the traded value, as depictured on the 
graph. 
 
Figure 5: Liquidity of day-ahead market as traded volume in MWh 
 
Source: based on OTE a.s. data 
 
The increase in liquidity is also apparent from the data on average hourly volume traded. While 
before market coupling the average hourly traded volume for the first 35 week was 253.95MWh, 
after introduction of market coupling the same characteristic climbed to 503.24MWh which 
corresponds to an increase of 49.53%. The entry of Slovak market subject was accompanied by 
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
120000
0
1
.2
0
0
9
0
3
.2
0
0
9
0
5
.2
0
0
9
0
7
.2
0
0
9
0
9
.2
0
0
9
1
1
.2
0
0
9
1
3
.2
0
0
9
1
5
.2
0
0
9
1
7
.2
0
0
9
1
9
.2
0
0
9
2
1
.2
0
0
9
2
3
.2
0
0
9
2
5
.2
0
0
9
2
7
.2
0
0
9
2
9
.2
0
0
9
3
1
.2
0
0
9
3
3
.2
0
0
9
3
5
.2
0
0
9
3
7
.2
0
0
9
3
9
.2
0
0
9
4
1
.2
0
0
9
4
3
.2
0
0
9
4
5
.2
0
0
9
4
7
.2
0
0
9
4
9
.2
0
0
9
5
1
.2
0
0
9
Volume (MWh)
Volume (MWh)
Start of Market Coupling in 36. week 
46 
 
further entry of other market participants – on Czech side as well as a direct result of market 
coupling, following higher liquidity, higher information value and credibility. 
 
Cross-border flows  
In hypothesis #3 we were attempting to establish one of the countries as a net exporter and 
validate Czech Republic as an exporter also in short term market – although it represents a 
relatively small fraction of the total electricity market. We identified following criteria: 
- Total volume traded, volume exported by Czech Republic, volume exported by Slovakia 
(since it is market coupling Czechs export to Slovakia only and vice versa) 
- Hours in which one country was a net exporter (also dominance on the market) 
 
The results are summarized in Table 3 below. By analyzing the data on cross border flows the 
exporting position of Czech Republic could be confirmed. From the point of traded volumes, 
approximately 73% of traded electricity is being traded in the area of Czech Republic in 2009, 
with 58% in 2010 and almost 76% in the first half of 2011. This confirms the dominant position 
of Czech Republic in the common market and dependence of Slovakia on electricity import.
98
.  
 
Table 3: Data on importing/exporting position of the respective countries 
  
2009 2010 2011 
Volume Amount traded (MWh) 532,601.50 1,702,249.3 1,157,169.3 
  
Czech Republic - 
exporting 72.79% 58.31% 75.86% 
  
Slovak Republic - 
exporting 27.21% 41.69% 24.14% 
Hours Hours traded 2,902 8,759 4,343.0 
  
Czech Republic - 
exporting 66.64% 58.65% 66.94% 
  
Slovak Republic - 
exporting 33.36% 41.35% 33.06% 
 
The prevalence of Czech export becomes apparent also by looking at the data that determine how 
often (meaning on which trading hours) did the country took the exporter position. In 2009 and 
2011 – who are years when the data available are only for parts of the years (2009 from 
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September and in 2011 until June which is documented also in the column “hours traded” in the 
Table 3) – Czech Republic is exporting in 2/3 of cases, leaving the exporting position to Slovakia 
in 1/3 of all cases. In 2010 Czech Republic is still a dominant exporter but the difference is 
relatively smaller compared to the other two years. 
Czech Republic is also trading higher volumes and contributes therefore with larger weight to the 
short term market. The average hourly cross border flow from Czech Republic is significantly 
larger than in the case of Slovakia – see Table 4 below. 
 
Table 4: Average cross border flows 
Average cross border flow - respective country exporting to the later country 
in MWh 
  2009 2010 2011 
Czech Republic  132.4 113.3 202.1 
Slovak Republic 49.5 81 64.3 
    
    Hours in which respective country was a net exporter 
   2009 2010 2011 
Czech Republic 1,934 5,137 2,907 
Slovak Republic 968 3,622 1,436 
 
The efficient functioning of market coupling can be supported by further evidence: number of 
market participants is increasing (from 22 in 2009 to 33 in 2010
99
) and the amount of traded 
volume in Slovak republic is significant - 8% of total consumption. Although establishment of a 
functioning market coupling in a rather short time could be considered a success, more 
investment in the network capacity is needed in order to extract all potentially positive effects
100
 
over long term.  
 
Price convergence 
Since one price for both geographical areas is a sign of effective market coupling we will use 
another set of data on prices from the Power exchange Central Europe in Prague in order to 
determine whether price convergence takes price. The data we analyze here are publicly 
available daily data on 1-year electricity supply futures that are traded on Power Exchange 
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Central Europe in Prague (www.pxe.cz) from January 2
nd
 2009 until July 29
th
 2011. The price in 
question is a price in Euros per MWh.  
The price difference should under the assumption of efficient markets facilitation 
arbitrage reflect only the transportation cost associated with cross-border transmission. We 
compare the prices of electricity 1-year futures for Czech Republic and Slovakia in order to 
determine, whether they converge, whether there is an improvement after introduction of market 
coupling in September 2009 and whether the price difference reflects the implied transportation 
costs. 
The results are summarized in the Table 5 below. The calculated average price 
differential decreases significantly after the introduction of market coupling, influencing the 
prices of 1-year futures on the Power Exchange in Prague. The price differential decreased in 
absolute terms but also the price equalized more often after market coupling was introduced in 
September 2009. Prices differed: 
- in 164 days out of 168 in the first part of 2009 
- in 77 cases out of 82 in the second part of 2009 after introduction of market coupling.  
- in 107 cases out of 251 in 2010 
- 3 times out of 148 in the first part of 2011 (until July 27th 2011, latest available data) 
 
Table 5: Price convergence – average price differential in €/MWh and its occurrence 
  2009/1 2009/1 2010 2011 
Average price 
differential (€/MWh) 
1.019881 0.231111 0.034891 0.02195 
Occurrence 97.62% 93.90% 42.63% 2.03% 
 
Prices converge on more accounts after market coupling. The effect is not as significant in the 
second part of 2009 (which refers to the 4 months with market coupling). The delay can be 
explained by the fact that the futures in question have a relatively longer maturity – 1 year 
maturity and are therefore slightly more rigid. The occurrence of price differential is almost 
insignificant in 2011 when on almost 98% of all trading days are prices identical. Furthermore 
the respective correlation coefficient calculated from the daily prices for Slovakia and Czech 
Republic is 0.975 which speaks of high level of association among these two sets of prices. 
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7.3.4. Conclusion 
 Proposed hypothesizes could be confirmed on the data sample examined. The evidence found 
supports the assumption that market coupling between Czech Republic and Slovakia is 
functioning efficiently, without frictions which is enabled by sufficient cross-border capacity. 
Also dominant exporting position of Czech Republic based on the data from short term market 
could be confirmed. It exports twice as much electricity to Slovakia than in imports. Regarding 
the data we could find evidence of majority of the criteria of best practices mentioned above 
including lower volatility, higher liquidity and better utilization of transfer capacity. The 
intuition that higher prices in Slovakia result from higher wholesale prices due to the fact that 
markets decouple and Slovakia as importing country suffers from resulting higher prices could 
not be confirmed. Therefore we need to look for explanation of the price difference in the second 
part of electricity price – regulated fees and charges. 
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8. Regulated fees and charges 
 
 Regulated fees and charges are fully in control of the national regulatory offices - Energy 
Regulatory Office in Czech Republic and Regulatory Office for Network industries. The 
objective of regulatory policies is to create a competitive environment but to protect investors 
and customers at the same time. Therefore the fees and charges should be reasonable and reflect 
the real costs and investments of all participants, enforcing effective utilization of their assets. 
The end customer is charged in principle the same fees which are grouped and named differently 
in respective countries. In the following section we list and examine data on fees as stated in the 
annual reports of respective regulators: ERU and URSO. In reality fees differ based on annual 
consumption and tariff therefore we use the average. Also calculated price for active energy 
differs from wholesale prices since the active price includes profit margin of the electricity 
supplier. Regulated fees and charges include several fees discussed below. 
8.1. Transmission 
 The transmission system is operated by fully state owned TSOs - CEPS and SEPS, Czech 
Republic and Slovakia respectively and includes high voltage lines: 220kV and 400kV. The fee 
covers charges for transmitted electricity, losses and reserve capacity
101
 and therefore reflects the 
electricity price on wholesale markets which is purchased to cover for the losses. Transmission 
was slightly but not significantly more expensive in Czech Republic where it covers larger area 
and the length of transmission lines is larger in absolute terms.   
8.2. Balancing services 
 TSOs are responsible for keeping the transmission system in balance, meaning the amount of 
electricity consumed must equal the amount of electricity fed into the system at any given time. 
System operators therefore purchase supporting services from several providers that basically do 
not primarily supply electric energy to customers but function as reserve generators in case there 
are sudden and unpredicted events either in electricity consumption or production. These events 
can include extreme weather conditions (temperatures, wind, rainfall influencing production in 
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wind, hydro and photovoltaic power plants), technical difficulties and other events requiring 
regulatory interventions. In Slovakia and similarly Czech Republic these are covered by 
production from conventional energy sources – mainly fossil fuels102. The fee covers the costs 
for such purchased services. 
The fee was during observed years from 2008 until 2011 higher in Slovakia by 30% to 43% and 
may refer to lower competition among service providers and the constitution of energy mix of 
respective countries. Fossil fuels especially coal is more available in Czech Republic whereas 
Slovakia has relatively larger share of gas turbines, that rank amongst the most expensive energy 
sources. 
8.3. Distribution fee  
 The distribution fee is has the largest weight in the structure of regulated fees and 
significantly influences the final electricity price. This is documented by the share on the final 
price of approximately 30%-35% in Czech Republic and 36% - 41% in Slovakia. 
The fee distribution consists of two parts:  
- fixed price for reserved capacity (€/month), 
- variable price (€/kWh) according to actually distributed amount of electricity 
 
 Distribution fees differ in both countries among regions where distribution companies are 
active. In both countries there are three distribution areas. Czech Republic is divided into north 
and south, plus much smaller area of the capital Prague, in Slovakia distribution regions are more 
equal in regards to the area they are covering with the country divided into west, center and east.  
The distribution fee is determined by different cost of operation
103
, investments into network 
development and repairs, with factors like number of customers, used capacity/km, type of 
distribution lines (air, land or cable profiles), total amount of electricity distributed along with 
technical specifications. The price of distribution the end customer is paying is then regionally 
bound, but also depends on the tariff and the total annual consumption.  
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The fee is constructed in order to cover the costs plus a reasonable profit margin. Regulatory 
office determines the maximal share of losses during distribution
104
. The costs associated with 
losses include also unregistered access and illegal electricity consumption. 
 The average fee for distribution has been significantly higher for Slovak household than 
Czech with the difference reaching 28% in 2008 which in absolute terms means a difference of 
€16.65/MWh. This appears to be one of the main factors of different household electricity prices 
between Czech Republic and Slovakia. Interestingly, the distribution fees, including the fee for 
distribution losses has been decreasing in Slovakia, with a very opposite trend observed in Czech 
Republic. In fact, the total fee for distribution including losses is projected to break even in 2011, 
with a slightly higher average costs for Czech households. This development corresponds with 
the shrinking of the price differential recorded by EUROSTAT statistics presented in the 
beginning of this chapter, where it is becoming apparent that while Slovak prices stagnate, Czech 
are coming closer to Slovak level. 
8.4. Short term market operator fee 
 Since in Slovakia is this fee included in the system operator tariff since and exists in this 
form only in Czech Republic, a separate comparison cannot be made. Instead we include this fee 
to the fee for renewable energy sources in Czech Republic in order to enable comparison.  
8.5.A Electricity tax 
 Newly stipulated electricity consumer tax – introduced in 2008 in Czech Republic, with Act. 
No. 261/2007 Coll., also called ecological tax. It is fixed at CZK 28.30/MWh (€1.16/ MWh) and 
is equal for everybody, paid by the electricity supplier to the Customs Administration in bulk for 
all customers. It has insignificant impact on final electricity price. 
8.5.B Fee for nuclear decommissioning fund and disposal of burn-up 
nuclear fuel 
 Slovak Republic introduced a surcharge effective from 2011 the Ordinance of the 
Government no. 426/2010 Coll. which imposes a fee for levy into the National Nuclear 
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Decommissioning Fund and Disposal of Burn-up Nuclear Fuel and Radioactive Waste in the 
amount of €3/MWh105. This is due to the ongoing decommissioning of nuclear power plant 
Bohunice.  
 
8.6. Support of renewable sources of energy and system operator 
tariff 
 There are two terms for describing in principle one fee, depending on the country. In Czech 
Republic the subsidies in form of a feed-in-tariff are simply called “Support of RES”, in Slovakia 
they are covered with one System operator tariff that also includes the fee for short term market 
operator OKTE, 100% daughter company of the Slovak TSO. This is included since 2010, before 
this date Slovak TSO was responsible for accounting activities and organization of short term 
market.  Furthermore, the system operator tariff includes not only support of electricity buyout 
from RES, so called feed-in-tariff, but also coal mining subsidies
106
. Controversially, all 
customers pay a fee subsidizing non-ecological coal mining and renewable resources of energy.  
 
Table 6: System operator tariff in €/MWh 
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 
Czech Republic 1.55 2.15 6.77 15.39 
Slovakia 2.81 2.72 6.30 14.85 
 
In the comparison above, the fee for Czech Republic is a sum of the RES fee and short term 
market operator fee which correspond structure-wise to the Slovak system operator tariff. In this 
way they can be compared. It becomes clear from the overview that in 2008 the fee was almost 
double in Slovakia, however the difference to Czech Republic is insignificant in absolute terms, 
ranging from €1.26/MWh in 2008 to €0.47/MWh in 2010.  
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8.6.1. Feed-in-tariff 
 The development of renewable energy sources (hereinafter “RES”) proceeds in line with the 
overall target for 2020 when the share of RES in final energy consumption is set at 14% for 
Czech Republic and 13% for Slovakia
107
. The main support tool for private investments into 
RES is so called feed-in-tariffs. It describes prices for which are electricity grid operators (who 
are distribution companies in the examined countries) by law required to buy electricity 
produced from privately (either by individuals or companies) owned generators at prices that are 
determined by long term contracts. The price is set by the respective regulatory office and 
therefore is fixed for mid-term period.  
 
Table 7: Feed-in-tariffs, prices valid for April 1st, 2010 in €/kWh 
Member state wind power solar PV biomass hydro 
Czech Republic 0.108 0.455 0.077 - 0.103 0.081 
Slovakia  0.05- 0.09  0.27  0.072 - 0.10 0.066 - 0.10 
Source: www.energy.eu 
 
 Czech Republic implemented a feed-in tariff by act of law no. 180/2005 for wide range of 
renewable sources in 2005
108
. Slovakia introduced a very similar act of law, (No. 309/2009 Coll. 
on the Promotion of Renewable Sources of Energy and High-Efficiency Cogeneration) effective 
from September 1
st
, 2009. The feed-in-tariff is a premium payment, therefore by definition 
higher than the price paid for energy from conventional sources. In Germany, the Federal 
Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety published a study that 
shows that this system of subsidies results in an increase of costs for German households
109
. The 
reports of respective ministries in Czech and Slovak republic show similar results. In Slovak 
republic the total projected amount paid by customers in year 2011 is as high as €322 million, 
which is almost triple the level of 2010 when the tariff amounted to €137 million total. Since the 
majority of these subsidies flows to private investors, this kind of arrangement raises 
controversy. It is said that without these subsidies the electricity prices would have dropped in 
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2011
110
. At the same time, this is the most rapidly growing part of regulated fees - they rose 
significantly from 1.7€/MWh in 2010 to 8.8€/MWh in 2011 which represent an annual increase 
of 517%. 
 
Figure 6: System operator tariff and its share on final price of electricity in €/MWh 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Slovak Republic
111  
The total cost of RES subsidies in Slovakia is broken down demonstrated in Figure 7 below. 
Based on this information it possible to conclude two statements valid for Slovakia:  
1. Total cost of RES subsidies rose in 2011 to almost 5 times the level of previous year.  
2. The increase is cause predominantly by photovoltaic energy resources that accounted 
for more than 60% of the total costs. 
This suggests that feed-in-tariffs for photovoltaic energy were set too high which would explain 
the boom in reported installed capacity of photovoltaic energy sources. As mentioned above, the 
total installed capacity in first half of 2011 already exceeded the target for 2020 by 50%. In 
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addition to that production costs of photovoltaic energy have been constantly decreasing and it is 
estimated that the costs of photovoltaic energy will reach the level of conventional energy 
resources by 2015
112
. In some cases this has already been reached.  
Figure 7: Support of renewable energy sources in Slovakia in millions of EUR 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Slovak Republic 
 A similar situation to Slovakia was experienced in Czech Republic a year earlier when the 
boom of photovoltaic power plants along with a simultaneous drop in construction costs inflated 
estimates of electricity price increase to as high as 18% annually
113
. Analysis of the Czech 
regulator concludes that if the subsidies in Czech republic remained at the level from 2010, 
electricity prices would have sunk by 1.4%-3.8%
114
. Due to this information, the Czech 
government responded quickly in the form of an addendum that stopped subsidies of solar power 
plants altogether and in addition to that introduced a 26% tax on revenues from this resource 
which should be effective retrospectively on solar panels installed since year 2009
115
.  
Nonetheless support for renewable resources remains a part of regulated fees. The Czech 
regulator estimates that it will cost 32 Mld. Czech crowns (1.32 Mld. Euro) as opposed to 8 Mld. 
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Czech crowns (330 million Euro) in 2010
116
. The number was lowered through a subsidy from 
the government, which in turn lowered the fee charged to the end customer.   
Figure 8: Renewable energy sources support tariff in Kc/MWh 
 
Source: Energy regulation office
117
 
 In July 2011 the responsible Slovak ministry expressed the intention to change the current 
policy and the amount of feed-in-tariffs as a result of the boom in photovoltaic energy sources
118
. 
In the future it would be reasonable to target resources with greater potential (e.g. wind or 
biomass) and avoid booms and jumps in the process of achieving targets for 2020. Ideally, the 
progress should be linear in order to avoid overinvestment into most pricey resources. The fact 
that feed-in-tariffs were recognized as the major reason for price increases due to incorrectly set 
feed-in-tariffs through regulatory policies overshadows a potential positive impact renewable 
energy sources can have on wholesale prices over long term. The price dampening effect RES in 
energy mix can have on wholesale prices is referred to as the merit order effect. 
8.6.2. Merit order effect 
 Merit order refers to the pecking order in power supply where energy sources are used 
accordingly to their marginal costs: the cheapest energy sources like nuclear and wind energy are 
used first, followed by more expensive sources like coal and heat power plants, with the most 
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expensive – gas turbines – used during peak hours. Figure 9 demonstrates a typical example of 
demand and supply curves, where the supply curve is usually called merit order curve. 
Figure 9: Demonstration of merit order curve  
 
Source: Wind energy and electricity prices
119
, available under ww.ewea.org 
 Despite the fact that feed in tariffs are being blamed for increasing electricity prices, in 
theory higher share or RES in energy mix can have a direct and indirect price dampening effect. 
The direct effect refers to the constitution of supply curve. When more energy resources with 
low (almost zero) marginal cost like wind or solar energy are employed, this shifts the supply 
curve to the right. Since demand is inelastic, little changes in supply result in major price 
changes as can be seen in the figure above where price during peak hours decreases from level A 
to level B
120
. Furthermore there may be congestion issues during high wind periods which results 
in reduction in production of power plants at the end of the merit order curve. This in most cases 
leads to lower price in the market. However the impact of wind or solar energy depends on the 
time of the day – the impact is highest when the steepness is highest and vice versa. Moreover 
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variability of residual demand and instability of wind energy supply remain important factors
121
. 
There have been several studies trying to quantify the impact of merit order effect targeting 
mostly Germany, Denmark and Benelux, regions with relatively high share of wind power in 
energy mix. The estimates of price effect vary, from €3/MWh in Germany to €23/MWh in 
Benelux
122
. In addition to this, a higher share or RES can influence prices indirectly. If 
ecological technologies replace CO2-intensive technologies, the demand for certificates that are 
needed in order to comply with EU targets decreases resulting in overall savings.   
 The studies referenced here targeted countries where wind energy has a remarkable share in 
the production mix. In Czech Republic and Slovakia wind energy is not significant from the view 
of total production, therefore the presence of merit order effects in these observed countries 
remain highly questionable. In order to be able to observe and examine positive impact of RES 
in this form, wind energy must be far more developed than currently is.  
 With regards to the list above, a customer can influence his electricity cost only through 
certain extent. The only not regulated part of electricity price is the base load price. In our 
overview, the price for active electricity for households includes profit margin, is therefore 
typically higher than for industrial customers and is different from the price on wholesale 
markets. Depending on whether the electricity is being purchased based on long term contracts 
or on day-ahead markets, the distributor is able to purchase electricity for lower or higher prices. 
In addition to that several parts of the regulated fees are determined by the wholesale prices, e.g. 
distribution fee serves to cover losses, which is positively correlated with base load prices, since 
the system operator has to purchase electricity in real time in order to balance the whole system – 
the costs associated with such intervention are then born by distributors and charged to end 
customers. If the wholesale prices sink, than the fees can also be lowered in the next period. The 
ability of suppliers to purchase cheaper electricity increases their competitiveness in the market 
and depends on the production costs of the generator, which in turn are determined by energy 
mix used.  
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8.7. Overview 
 The total fees and charges were in 2010 the highest amongst observed countries
123
 and it is 
understood that current status quo ranks Slovakia among countries with the highest surcharges in 
Europe. Too high fees can impede competition if they elevate prices that would in turn 
discourage new entries. Regulated fees are determined by a variety of technological and 
economical aspects. Regulatory offices take into consideration the situation from previous years 
and estimates for the current year which makes it irresponsive and inflexible. Regulated fees 
were increasing in absolute terms during the observed period, with the exception of 2009, which 
reflects positive development on wholesale electricity markets. Wholesale prices had a 
decreasing tendency from 3. quarter of 2008
124
 due to which operators were able to purchase 
electricity for losses coverage in distribution and transmission at lower costs. Larger production 
from photovoltaic sources is accountable for the notable increase in regulated fees from year 
2010 on, which is a failure of regulatory policies in both countries. Also the level of fees reacts 
to lower total consumption in previous years. Lower total consumption in year 2009
125
 translates 
into higher costs per unit for the following year - costs are being divided into lower number of 
units.  
Figure 10: Comparison of regulated fees total: Czech Republic and Slovakia 
CZ         
 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Regulated fees total 55.04 54.48 64.03 79.82 
SK         
 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Regulated fees total 72.35 69.43 73.00 80.72 
          
 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Difference 17.31 14.95 8.97 0.90 
Difference in % 23.93% 21.53% 12.29% 1.12% 
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 The difference in fees explains the household price difference between these two countries. 
Aside from more liquid market, in Czech republic currency exchange rate also plays a role, since 
this country kept its currency – the Czech crown after entry to EU in 2004. Czech currency 
(towards Euro) was especially strong in year 2007 and 2008
126
 and is in general terms a stronger 
currency than the Slovak crown, which was in validity until 1.1.2009 when Slovakia adopted 
Euro as it‟s official currency. Czech Republic was also able to benefit in the past from 
significantly lower distribution costs – the difference in the distribution fee of €16.65/MWh in 
2008 represents 96.16% of the total difference in regulated fees for that year. Similarly for year 
2009 the share of difference in distribution fee was 77.44% and 86.48% in 2010. In 2011 
projected regulated fees are almost equal with no significant differences. This is due to the fact 
that while distribution costs in Czech Republic rose significantly, Slovak regulator was able to 
lower these, including a lowering in costs for distribution losses. In fact, in 2011 every item of 
the regulated part increased in Czech Republic, while Slovakia was able to lower transmission 
fee, balancing service fees and above mentioned distribution including losses. 
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9. Conclusion 
The analysis conducted in previous chapters leads to several conclusions. When it comes 
to market structure and concentration in the industry, there has been certain progress towards 
perfect competition but neither of the markets achieved a respectable level of competiveness that 
would resemble perfect competition. In Czech Republic the state remains an important player 
with a controlling share in the largest generation company – ČEZ and through its daughter 
company also the distribution network. ČEZ – distribution company operates on the largest area 
among the distribution regions and enables the Czech state to intervene not only through 
regulatory policies but also in the business sectors via direct strategic business decisions. 
Although Slovak government does hold only a minor share in the largest national 
electricity generator – SE – it is controlling all three distribution companies. Through different 
distribution tariffs for alternative and conventional electricity suppliers it is possible for the state 
to impede or facilitate competition. The number of alternative electricity providers is rising, with 
ČEZ Slovakia (a subsidy of ČEZ operating in Czech Republic) being the strongest competitor by 
number of customers. Although this subsidy dilutes market share of Slovak incumbents it 
increases an overall presence of this utility giant in the region. The documented customer 
behavior seems rather reluctant in both countries, with Czech Republic being slightly more 
advanced. Customer switching is very slow due to perceived issues with supply security and 
reliability of alternative producers.  
 The descriptive statistics for wholesale electricity price data suggest that wholesale markets 
work efficiently. Market coupling between Czech Republic and Slovakia rarely experiences 
congestion which is supported by the results of the analysis of data on market coupling. From the 
beginning of market coupling in September 2009 until June 2011 the markets decoupled only in 
42 cases which corresponds to 42 hours. Only in 23 cases the market decoupling resulting in 
different prices. Therefore the price difference could not be explained by an analysis of 
wholesale prices. We also concluded that the interconnector capacity is overall sufficient for 
trading and facilitates arbitrage. 
 Finally we analyzed regulated fees and charges in respective countries. Czech Republic and 
Slovakia have a very similar, almost identical fee structure. The only exception is the fee for 
nuclear decommissioning fund and disposal of burn-up nuclear fuel in Slovakia. Czech Republic, 
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unlike their eastern neighbor, imposed an ecological tax on electricity. The data also showed that 
regulated fees were significantly higher in Slovakia- by 24% n 2008, 21.5% in 2009 and 12.3% 
in 2010. The projected difference in regulated fees is rather insignificant for year 2011, though 
because the year 2011 is not finished yet, we cannot compare this to the real data and electricity 
prices for this year.  
 The conclusion we made above provides us with the answer to the research question: What 
factors cause the differences in final household electricity prices between Czech Republic and 
Slovakia? The decisive factor were higher regulated fees in Slovakia. We identified the fee for 
distribution to be the main reason for difference in final household prices. The difference in 
distribution fee alone is responsible for 77% to 96% of the total difference in regulated fees. 
Based on the available data we conclude that feed-in-tariffs contained in the system operator 
tariff is responsible for the increase in final price for years 2010 and 2011. If the contribution of 
the customers to renewable sources of energy stayed at the level from previous year, electricity 
prices for households in Czech Republic would have decreased, we can project the same 
outcome for Slovakia. The advantage of decreasing electricity prices on wholesale market, where 
regulating electricity is purchased for coverage of losses in transmission and distribution was 
cancelled out by increasing fees which in total resulted in higher prices.  
 The market structure in Czech Republic suggests that the distribution company CEZ with the 
largest distribution area is being influenced significantly by its owner – the Czech state who also 
determines fees the company can charge for distribution. Moreover, CEZ is being investigated 
by the European Commission on charges of competition hindering practices, as previously 
mentioned in the chapter on market structure. In Slovakia the state does not exercise such an 
influence, with more equally assigned distribution areas. With distribution fees being 
significantly lower in Czech Republic and accounting for almost the whole difference in final 
household electricity prices it becomes apparent, how important the presence of the Czech 
government as the controlling shareholder of CEZ is. 
 Implications for further policies can be derived from the experience from Czech and Slovak 
markets. In order to foster competitive environment the so called activating fee has to be relieved 
in Czech Republic. This fee is de facto a substitute of a switching fee and decreases the 
willingness of customers to change their supplier in response to more beneficial offer. Regarding 
international electricity trading, further investment into the development of electricity grid is 
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needed in order to ensure sufficient interconnector capacity with neighboring countries. 
Although it was not the objective of this thesis to examine, there is evidence on congestion 
between Czech Republic and Austria and Czech Republic and Germany.  
 What is Czech Republic and Slovakia experiencing right now is a boom in installed capacity 
of photovoltaic power plants. This can be blamed on too high feed-in-tariffs. Therefore more 
accurate setting of feed-in-tariffs is needed. In addition to that the regulator should enforce more 
control over the installed capacity of supported RES to ensure an adequate response in the case 
of need. The fulfillment of targets for 2020 of share of renewable energy sources in the 
electricity production should proceed more linear and avoid booms and steep price increases as a 
result of it.  
 Czech Republic and Slovakia remain to have a specific position within Europe and through 
introduction of market coupling became leaders in the central and eastern European region. For 
future fulfillment of the goals of European Union – creation of a free and integrated European 
electricity market – gradual integration of neighboring countries like Hungary or Poland is 
essential. A free and liberalized market gives more possibilities to the customers. At the same 
time the customer carries more responsibility to stay informed, react to more beneficial prices 
and incentivize all market subjects towards higher efficiency. In addition to that regulatory 
institutions should continue to create a competitive environment, eliminate market failures and 
support cross-border coordination and trading. 
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Appendix 1: Electricity generation by fuel – Czech Republic 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: IEA, http://www.iea.org/stats/pdf_graphs/CZELEC.pdf 
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Appendix 2: Electricity generation by fuel – Slovak Republic 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: IEA http://www.iea.org/stats/pdf_graphs/SKELEC.pdf
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Appendix 3: Results of Market Coupling – decoupled hours 
Date Hour 
Available 
capacity      
ČR->SR 
(MW) 
Available 
capacity            
SR->ČR 
(MW) 
Used 
capacity 
(export)       
ČR-
>SR 
(MW) 
Used 
capacity    
(import)       
SR-
>ČR 
(MW) 
Price for 
profile 
CZ/SK 
(EUR/MWh) 
07.01.2010 2 1,199.0 846.0 0.0 846.0 1.00 
07.01.2010 4 1,224.0 820.0 0.0 820.0 0.00 
07.01.2010 5 1,223.0 838.0 0.0 838.0 0.00 
03.06.2010 3 1,805.0 495.0 0.0 495.0 15.00 
03.06.2010 4 1,813.0 487.0 0.0 487.0 9.20 
03.06.2010 5 1,812.0 488.0 0.0 488.0 10.82 
07.06.2010 3 2,182.0 118.0 0.0 118.0 0.99 
22.07.2010 12 151.0 2,749.0 151.0 0.0 0.00 
22.07.2010 13 149.0 2,751.0 149.0 0.0 0.00 
22.07.2010 14 126.0 2,774.0 126.0 0.0 0.00 
22.07.2010 15 146.0 2,754.0 146.0 0.0 0.00 
22.07.2010 16 117.0 2,783.0 117.0 0.0 0.00 
22.07.2010 17 127.0 2,773.0 127.0 0.0 0.00 
22.07.2010 22 147.0 2,753.0 147.0 0.0 0.00 
25.11.2010 2 2,264.0 836.0 0.0 836.0 14.99 
26.11.2010 2 2,424.0 676.0 0.0 676.0 14.99 
04.12.2010 4 2,366.0 684.0 0.0 684.0 32.04 
09.12.2010 4 2,696.0 404.0 0.0 404.0 22.00 
11.12.2010 1 2,787.0 313.0 0.0 313.0 21.99 
11.12.2010 2 2,745.0 355.0 0.0 355.0 21.99 
11.12.2010 3 2,756.0 344.0 0.0 344.0 17.99 
11.12.2010 4 2,684.0 416.0 0.0 416.0 4.99 
11.12.2010 5 2,610.0 490.0 0.0 490.0 15.99 
17.12.2010 1 2,819.0 281.0 0.0 281.0 37.81 
17.12.2010 2 2,832.0 268.0 0.0 268.0 37.81 
17.12.2010 3 2,792.0 308.0 0.0 308.0 37.81 
17.12.2010 4 2,787.0 313.0 0.0 313.0 37.81 
17.12.2010 5 2,847.0 253.0 0.0 253.0 41.99 
17.12.2010 6 2,779.0 321.0 0.0 321.0 44.99 
17.12.2010 7 2,560.0 540.0 0.0 540.0 3.17 
 
 
 
 73 
 
Appendix 4: Overview of regulated fees and charges 
CZ 2008     2009     2010     2011     
 
% CZK EUR % CZK EUR % CZK EUR % CZK EUR 
Active power 55 1686.09 67.62 57.5 1949.06 73.69 42.27 1666.16 65.90 45.40 1612.24 66.22 
Market operator 0.2 4.63 0.19 0.13 4.75 0.18 0.12 4.75 0.19 0.13 4.75 0.20 
Balancing services 4.8 147.15 5.90 4.16 141.01 5.33 3.94 155.38 6.15 4.38 155.40 6.38 
RES 1.3 34.13 1.37 1.539 52.18 1.97 4.22 166.34 6.58 10.40 370.00 15.20 
Dec.vyroba 0.3 9.20 0.37 0.271 9.21 0.35 0.19 7.49 0.30 0.30 10.65 0.44 
Transmission 3 91.97 3.69 3.1 105.08 3.97 2.88 113.52 4.49 3.10 110.09 4.52 
Distribution 35.4 1085.23 43.53 33.3 1128.76 42.68 29.00 1143.09 45.21 35.60 1264.22 51.92 
Ecological tax 0 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 0.72 28.30 1.12 0.80 28.30 1.16 
TOTAL   3058.40 122.66   3390.04 128.17   3285.04 129.93   3555.66 146.03 
             Exchange rate (CZK for 1 EUR)   24.933     26.45     25.284     24.348 
             SK 2008     2009     2010     2011     
  % SKK EUR   % EUR   % EUR   % EUR 
Active power 43.07 1811.00 57.88   49.28 67.46   45.20 60.23   42.69 60.10 
System operator tariff 2.09 88.00 2.81   1.99 2.72   4.73 6.30   10.54 14.84 
Balancing services 6.97 293.00 9.36   6.84 9.36   7.21 9.60   6.35 8.95 
Transmission incl. losses 0.00 0.00 0.00   2.26 3.09   3.10 4.13   4.64 4.07 
Distribution excl. losses 44.78 1883.00 60.18   27.48 37.62   31.51 41.97   28.15 39.63 
Distribution losses 3.10 130.23     12.15 16.64   8.26 11.00   7.61 10.71 
Distribution total 44.78 1883.00 60.18   39.63 54.25   39.76 52.97     50.34 
TOTAL   4205.23 130.23     136.89     133.23     138.30 
                          
Exchange rate     31.291                   
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